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MS. HESSE:  I want to thank everyone for 
joining us this morning for the virtual 47th Annual 
Conference on International Law and Policy. 
We are doing the panel on “Tech, Platform, 
and Privacy — What the Future Holds,” a very minor set 
 2 
 
 
 
 
of issues to tackle in the next hour and twenty 
minutes.  Nothing big is going on in any of these 
areas, so I think this is going to be a very dull, 
boring discussion amongst this panel.  We will be 
covering privacy and competition law and policy with a 
mix of U.S. and European government and private sector 
perspectives. 
We have a terrific lineup this morning who I 
am going to introduce, and then we will jump right in.  
We will be holding some time at the end for 
questions from the audience, so please send those in 
using the Q&A function.  James will be moderating the 
questions and passing them to me.  Forgive us if we do 
not get to everything that comes in, but please do 
send your questions along and we will try to get them 
either as we move through the session or at the end.  
Please send them when they come up and we will see if 
we can address them. 
There is a CLE code for this session.  The 
CLE code is TPP20. 
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Let me introduce our panelists. 
Cani Fernández is the President of the 
National Commission for Markets and Competition in 
Spain.  She has had a very distinguished career —  
[audio cuts out repeatedly over the next 
couple of minutes]  
... of the antitrust department of Fried, 
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, and Vice Chair of 
the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust 
Law. 
Next is Sean Royall, a Partner at Kirkland & 
Ellis’s Dallas and Washington, D.C. offices and 
focuses on antitrust and consumer protection from both 
the litigation and government investigations 
perspectives.  Mr. Royall previously served as the 
Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, 
and in that capacity he supervised the FTC’s 
investigations of many major mergers and acquisitions, 
and also served as lead trial counsel in a landmark 
patent-related monopolization suit that the FTC 
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brought against computer chip designer Rambus. 
Last but definitely not least is Koren Wong-
Ervin, a Partner at Axinn, Veltrop, and Harkrider.  
She has also worked in-house, in academia, and in 
government, and previously served as an attorney 
adviser to FTC Commissioner Wright and counsel for IP 
and International Antitrust at the FTC. 
With those introductions, we are going to 
get started.   
Sean is going to lead off.  The first topic 
we are going to cover is the general question of where 
do privacy and competition come together. 
MR. ROYALL:  Thanks, Renata. 
I am going to kick us off by laying out some 
of the theories that have been proposed for how 
privacy-related concerns can — or in some cases 
arguably should — be taken into account in antitrust- 
and competition-related analyses, and then Koren is 
going to share some additional thoughts on each point, 
and maybe other panelists as well. 
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The first concept is that privacy — or, more 
specifically, protections on user or consumer privacy 
— can be viewed as a feature of competition.  The 
notion is that just as firms compete across a range of 
other quality-based dimensions, they also compete, or 
may compete, to win and retain users or consumers by 
offering to enforce more user-friendly privacy 
protections. 
With that as a starting premise, the theory 
is that in the absence of robust competition, dominant 
firms may lack incentives to improve their privacy and 
data collection practices in a way that would best 
serve consumer interests, and may even regress by 
failing to enforce their existing privacy policies, 
the idea being that erosion of privacy protections and 
diminished incentives to continue competing to improve 
such protections may be akin to an increase in 
quality-adjusted prices. 
Various people have discussed this idea, but 
it was featured, for example, in a 2019 article by 
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Dina Srinivasan entitled “The Antitrust Case Against 
Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards Pervasive 
Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for 
Privacy,” where she asserted that in the earlier years 
of social media platforms the platforms were competing 
furiously in an attempt to win market share in part 
through the quality of their privacy protection. 
Applying this concept, let’s say for example 
in a merger context, theoretically a merger that led 
to increased concentration in a market where firms 
depend heavily on the collection and accumulation of 
consumer data could potentially be seen as 
anticompetitive, in part because of an anticipated 
lessening in incentives to protect consumer privacy.  
I will note, though, that this theory seems to rest 
not only on the premise that firms at times compete on 
privacy, but also to some extent on some built-in 
assumptions.   
One of those is an underlying assumption 
that consumers do in fact, and maybe even universally, 
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take privacy into account when they choose among 
alternative products and services.   
Another assumption seems to be that 
consumers as a group think about and value privacy and 
data collection practices in a sufficiently uniform 
way that one can observe which approaches to these 
issues may be “better” or more consumer-friendly than 
others. 
In a speech earlier this year given by FTC 
Commissioner Noah Phillips at Stanford Law School, he 
touched on these issues.  He expressed fairly deep 
skepticism about antitrust theories that presume some 
form of consensus in terms of how consumers approach 
privacy-related issues and what tradeoffs they are 
willing to make in choosing among products and 
services.   
He noted that while we all want lower 
prices, there are examples of consumers exhibiting 
fundamentally divergent views about privacy.  He 
suggested that even if there is something to this 
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“privacy as quality” concept, you need to be very 
careful where the value or aspect of competition that 
you are focused on is one that potentially lends 
itself to polar disagreements among the very consumers 
whose interests you are seeking to protect. 
The last thing I would mention is that 
quality as a form of competition is not an entirely 
novel concept for antitrust.  It is also not something 
that comes up very often, at least as a central 
concern for antitrust enforcement in the merger 
context or otherwise.  While there are examples of 
mergers being challenged because of effects in 
innovation markets, usually when these issues arise 
there is some very concrete and identifiable risk to 
consumers. 
With that introduction of the issue, Koren, 
what are your thoughts on this? 
MS. WONG-ERVIN:  Thank you, and thank you to 
the organizers for inviting me and to Renata for 
organizing this panel. 
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I think that the privacy-as-quality analogy 
on its face is appealing, but when you take a closer 
look, I think the analogy falls apart, and this is for 
at least four reasons.  There is a really excellent 
paper by Professor James Cooper that goes over some of 
these, and I recommend you read this paper.1 
The first reason is that, unlike a 
manufacturer who is exercising monopoly power to skimp 
on quality in order to make more money, when you have, 
say, an online publisher who decides to collect and 
mine additional data, there is no automatic benefit to 
that publisher from reducing privacy.  In fact, when 
you collect and store and analyze data, that is an 
additional cost.   
So I think it is more appropriate to look at 
the publisher’s collection and use of data as an 
investment.  The publisher hopes that it can use this 
data to enhance revenue through providing consumers 
 
1 James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, The First Amendment, and 
Subjectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1147 (2013). 
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with higher-quality content and selling more finely 
targeted ads.  So, to me reductions in privacy would 
be an odd way to exercise monopoly power. 
The second thing is that unlike, let’s say, 
a lower-quality car, consumers derive some benefits 
from the data they reveal, and those benefits must be 
weighed against any privacy reductions.  Of course, 
these benefits can include increased or better 
services or products and revenue streams that allow 
platforms to offer things like zero-monetary-price 
goods and services. 
The third thing is what Sean mentioned, 
which is that the value that consumers place on these 
costs and benefits varies greatly throughout the 
population, which would make identifying a lessening 
of competition difficult to say the least.  I think 
when you take into consideration the varying privacy 
tastes of consumers, a firm’s decision to collect more 
or less data should be seen as product differentiation 
and not as an exercise of monopoly power. 
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The fourth reason is what is known as the 
“privacy paradox,” or the difference between stated 
and revealed preferences — for example, the difference 
between what consumers say on surveys and how they 
behave in the real world.  Now, this is not to say 
that privacy is not important or that consumers do not 
have an increased expectation of privacy, but rather 
to say that it is complicated and that we should be 
very wary of government enforcers imposing their own 
privacy tastes on consumers. 
The last thing I will say is that in the 
unilateral conduct context it is particularly 
difficult for me to envision the privacy-as-quality 
theory because you need some type of exclusionary 
conduct that results in harm to competition.  If you 
have poor privacy alone, that is not sufficient.  At 
least in the United States, firms are free to charge 
the highest price that the market will bear. 
Now there is one type of conduct that I have 
heard, and I will turn it back over to Sean to discuss 
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that. 
MR. ROYALL:  Focusing on unilateral conduct, 
it has been suggested that a second way that privacy-
related concerns may warrant antitrust enforcement is 
in instances in which a firm arguably has made 
misrepresentations about privacy in order to secure a 
dominant market position.   
In the same article that I mentioned 
earlier, Dina Srinivasan asserts that Facebook engaged 
in what she claims was a “decade-long pattern of false 
statements and misleading conduct” involving claims of 
superior representations of protecting consumer 
privacy, all with the aim of inducing consumers to 
trust and favor Facebook over all targets.  She 
asserts that Facebook’s robust privacy-related 
assurances in that time period foreclosed competition 
in what was at that time a contested market, but that 
the company then later consciously reneged on its 
commitments in a way that she claims is evidence that 
the company now possesses monopoly power. 
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Renata mentioned that while I was at the FTC 
I was involved in the FTC’s Rambus case, and this 
theory does remind me a bit of Rambus.  The argument 
there was that Rambus exploited an industry standard-
setting process by making false assurances to other 
participants that it lacked patent rights over 
proposed designs for computer memory chips that were 
being standardized, and once the industry was 
irreversibly locked into using the standardized design 
that they adopted, Rambus then surfaced its patents 
and began demanding royalties. 
Koren, Rambus and I think some other cases 
do at least provide some precedent for using the 
antitrust law to challenge alleged deceptive conduct 
that gives rise to monopoly power, but what do you 
think about applying these concepts of alleged 
misrepresentations about privacy? 
MS. WONG-ERVIN:  I will be very brief in 
case Barry or Cani want to jump in. 
I think that at the very least you would 
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need a deception that is material in that it shifts 
demand, and durable in that it is not easily 
discovered or corrected, or that even once discovered 
consumers cannot switch.  Under Rambus, of course, we 
know there is the but-for standard, so a plaintiff 
would need to prove that but for the misrepresentation 
consumers would have chosen a different technology. 
I do think there is one wrinkle to applying 
Rambus – I am not saying that I don’t like the but-for 
standard because I do — and that is that unlike in 
Rambus, where you had a technology that was set 
through standardization and there is arguably lock-in, 
that is not the case in, say, Facebook or Google or 
other platforms where consumers can and do switch. 
MS. HESSE:  Let me jump in for a second with 
a couple of follow-up questions.  There are two that I 
want to hand out to people, whoever wants to jump in 
and answer. 
One is: Do we think that competition would 
lead to greater transparency amongst firms in their 
 15 
 
 
 
 
privacy policies and how they protect privacy, and is 
that a value that is something that competition law 
should care about? 
The other question goes to Sean, and he can 
maybe answer that first and then we can go on, but 
others might have views on this too.  You mentioned 
the Rambus case.  I am wondering whether you have 
views based on that experience and whether others have 
views on how difficult it might be to bring an 
antitrust case against a social media platform, for 
example, for allegedly reneging on privacy policy 
assurances; and, if you think that would be difficult, 
why? 
I will throw those out to the group and let 
you all take it away. 
MR. ROYALL:  I can comment briefly on the 
second question.  Barry actually was at the FTC and we 
were both in the deputy positions overlapping during 
the Rambus years, and Barry may have been more 
involved in the Commission appeal because I left right 
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after the administrative trial. 
We agonized in developing that case at the 
FTC over proof issues and elements of proving 
monopolization or attempted monopolization in this 
context.  A couple of things that we agonized over and 
spent a lot of time on are exactly things that Koren 
alluded to.   
One of them is: Was there true lock-in?  
Because the whole theory was what economists refer to 
as “hold-up,” that you needed a lock-in in order for 
the parties that were allegedly harmed by this to have 
been vulnerable to monopolistic practices. 
In that case, there was a standard that was 
adopted and there were literally billions of dollars 
of capital investment around building memory chips 
according to the standard that had been adopted, and 
those investments occurred and they were sunk 
irreversible costs before arguably — there was 
disputed evidence — before anyone knew that Rambus had 
or asserted patent rights.  So we thought there was 
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rather strong evidence of lock-in. 
I do not know here how you would prove lock-
in.  I think we are going to talk a little bit more 
later about the concept of multihoming and the fact 
that in social media people use different social media 
platforms; people are not necessarily locked into one.  
There is also potential to move, to port data from one 
to another.  I just don’t know that the lock-in 
concept really works or applies here. 
The other thing that Koren alluded to is 
but-for causation.  This actually ended up being a 
weakness in the Rambus case that caused the D.C. 
Circuit ultimately to reverse.   
Speaking for the trial team in that case, we 
were very focused on proving but-for causation and 
proving that for each element of the standard that was 
at issue there was an alternative technology, and the 
proof, including contemporaneous documents and 
testimony, showed that had the participants known 
about Rambus’s patents, they had available alternative 
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technologies and they would have adopted them and 
avoided any patent exposure.  In the end, the D.C. 
Circuit found that the proof was not convincing on 
that point. 
I do not know how you would prove but-for 
causation here — that is, that but for these 
representations about privacy that consumers would not 
have adopted the Facebook platform.  Koren referred to 
this idea of the difference between maybe what people 
say in surveys and what their revealed preferences 
are.  I do not know how you would use a survey group 
or some other group to persuasively show that it was 
the privacy-related representations that people were 
relying on that caused them to adopt the platform. 
MR. NIGRO:  I am happy to comment on that 
briefly.   
If a firm makes a representation or a 
promise to keep certain information private and then 
breaks that promise, it seems to me there is obviously 
a breach of contract claim.  I agree with Sean that it 
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is not so obvious how that would automatically convert 
into an antitrust claim. 
I think one of the challenges with privacy 
is that it is not entirely clear how much people care 
about it.  I think people know when they sign on to 
these platforms or do business with a particular firm 
that they are giving up a certain amount of 
information or privacy in exchange for whatever 
product or service they are looking to acquire.   
I think if people really cared about privacy 
and that affected their demand, that firms would 
respond to that and it would be a significant 
qualitative basis for competition among the firms.  It 
would show up in the documents; it would be something 
that they might advertise against each other on, etc.  
It is just not clear to me how concerned people are 
about privacy. 
I do think it is important to distinguish 
between privacy as some qualitative basis on which 
firms compete and privacy as something that is valued 
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as a matter of social policy.   
In the case of the latter, I don’t know that 
antitrust is the right tool to address it.  I think 
that is better addressed through the legislative 
process and the Executive Branch.  It does not neatly 
fit into the antitrust world and I think efforts to 
try to put it there when it belongs better elsewhere 
are misguided.  I am hesitant to try to use antitrust 
to address all concerns that people have with privacy. 
MS. HESSE:  Cani, do you might something to 
say? 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Thank you very much, Renata. 
Listening to you and the whole debate on 
whether consumers value privacy or not reminds me of 
the movie Monty Python’s Life of Brian, when there is 
this queue of people going to the crucifixion, and the 
Romans ask them, “Crucifixion?” and they say, “Yes, 
please.” 
This is the view I have when you have to 
tick to the privacy concern that you have to give in 
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platforms.  It is either you say “yes” or you are 
banned for life — you cannot use Facebook; you cannot 
use Google; you cannot use anything that everybody is 
using — and trying to survive with that goal, as I 
have been trying to for some months, it is very 
interesting the limitations that you are facing in 
order to compete in searching with others. 
I think that in the privacy debate privacy 
has come at the moment in which we as consumers 
probably have to surrender our privacy rights in order 
to be able to use the service.  There is not 
sufficient competition in these services, so I do not 
think it is a really good choice or a choice in 
competition terms.  That is my personal view.  I 
wanted to be a little controversial in that.   
There is a long debate on how consumers 
value privacy, and I think there is a new set of 
studies that puts the emphasis on the questions that 
are to be made to consumers in order to ascertain 
whether they value privacy or not. 
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As to the debates on the relationship 
between privacy and competition, I think this is a 
very complex and manifold debate.  The goal is to find 
the right balance, in my view, between competition and 
user-protection objectives.   
In some cases, regulation aiming at 
protecting consumers may have unintended consequences 
in competition, even adverse effects.  Sometimes 
getting consumer consent — for example, with the new 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe — 
may be very cumbersome.  And those that are already in 
the market, the Big Tech companies, the incumbents, 
those that were already dominant companies when the 
GDPR was adopted, are not facing that constraint 
because we already consented.  Even now, if we consent 
once, we consent for the whole group of different 
services or vertical searches that they are having.  
So for new entrants it is not irrelevant how to 
compete with this tick on privacy that sometimes is 
very cumbersome. 
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There are several theoretical and empirical 
studies that are showing us that Big Tech, or even 
incumbent companies that are already in those markets, 
may be using the privacy regulation strategically in 
order to set up barriers to entry — for example, in 
data-sharing situations where others that could be new 
entrants and enjoy the possibility of those synergies 
in those data-sharing situations are barred from doing 
so on the basis of regulation that is there in order 
to protect consumers.  This is an unintended 
consequence. 
We have experiences of regulation that has 
gone in the contrary sense, that has proved to be 
procompetitive.  One example of this is the Payment 
Services Directive, which has played an important role 
in establishing a framework within which financial 
information from consumers must flow under secure 
conditions so that fin-tech companies, for example, 
are able to enter the market offering services that 
are in a way increasing competition in those markets. 
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So I would say that we should follow a case-
by-case approach.  I am not sure that we have already 
exhausted all the debates on whether privacy is good 
or bad for competition and whether it is a parameter 
of consumer welfare.  I think there are many things to 
say there. 
It is true that even when talking about 
privacy we should be able to at least guarantee 
interoperability and data portability and multihoming 
because this is going to reduce switching costs.  
Given the high concentration in the market and the 
lock-in effects and the tipping dynamics that we are 
experiencing, that could be reduced. 
That is my first intervention in this panel.  
Thank you. 
MS. HESSE:  Thanks, Cani. 
Much as I would like to keep talking about 
this, because it is super-interesting, I think we need 
to shift to our second topic, which is the topic of 
the hour, and then maybe if we have a little bit more 
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time, we can come back to this, because I think there 
are lots of interesting questions about regulation as 
a barrier to entry or creating barriers to entry for 
smaller firms and questions about how the GDPR and the 
California legislation have worked and what we can 
learn about that as we go forward, particularly in the 
United States, where we do not have any federal 
privacy regulation yet. 
But let’s jump into the Big Tech topic area.  
Barry and Cani are going to lead us out on this one.  
Here we are going to talk a bit about competition 
enforcement versus regulation and whether these tools 
are likely to be an effective way to address the 
concerns and the issues that have been raised and that 
we have been hearing about —  I do not mean to comment 
one way or the other on whether those are valid or 
invalid — but the things that we have been hearing 
being expressed about what we like to call Big Tech. 
Barry, do you want to start us off? 
MR. NIGRO:  Sure.  Thank you, Renata. 
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“Big Tech” is like “Big Data.”  It seems 
like when people use that term they are suggesting a 
conclusion, which is that there must be a problem 
because it has the modifier “big” in front of it.  I 
think in order to evaluate competition issues — 
whether it is Big Tech, Big Data, or anything in that 
realm — it is important to recognize that the concerns 
and the issues can vary quite significantly.  So 
precision is important when you talk about concerns 
with Big Tech. 
I don’t think it is fair to lump them all 
together and treat them as though they all benefit and 
suffer from the same sorts of issues, especially when 
you are trying to decide whether the appropriate tool 
for addressing those concerns is regulation or 
competition. 
Our general preference in the United States 
is for competition over regulation.  I think this has 
been a well-recognized principle going back hundreds 
of years.  If you look at the Supreme Court’s Northern 
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Pacific Railroad case, it talks about the Sherman Act 
resting on the premise that the unrestrained 
interaction of competitive forces yields the best 
allocation of resources, the lowest price, and the 
highest quality.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in 1951 in 
Standard Oil acknowledged the long-held faith in the 
value of competition.  Much of the work of the 
Antitrust Division has been aimed at furthering that 
value and protecting it and ensuring that our markets 
remain competitive. 
That is not to say that there are not some 
circumstances when regulation may be appropriate.  If 
you think about markets that have characteristics of a 
natural monopoly, where the economies of scale and the 
savings from those economies are so pronounced, it may 
be that the most efficient outcome is to have a single 
firm — a monopolist so to speak.  It could be in that 
case that, because of natural monopoly 
characteristics, it is feasible to implement some sort 
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of regulation in a way that improves market 
performance, as compared to the economic performance 
that would otherwise be associated with unregulated 
markets; it may be that some sort of limited 
regulation is appropriate. 
I also think that even where you have a 
dominant firm for some period, that is not necessarily 
a bad thing.  If you think about what the Court said 
in Trinko, charging monopoly prices by itself is not 
only not unlawful but it is the opportunity to do so 
that, at least for a short period, is what attracts 
business acumen, and that induces risk-taking and 
ideally in the long run produces greater output and 
innovation.   
It has generally been the view of the 
antitrust agencies that big is not bad but big 
behaving badly is bad.  I think that is a common 
refrain. 
I also think it is important to take account 
of some of the learning that we have done in this 
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area.   
Commissioner Wilson recently spoke about the 
benefits of deregulation.  In particular, she focused 
on the bipartisan decision to disband the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board in 
deregulating the railroad and airline industries and 
the benefits of lower prices, higher output, and more 
innovation that resulted from those efforts. 
I think it is important to recognize that 
regulation does have a cost associated with it — it is 
not cost-free; it is a tradeoff — and that tradeoff 
should be reserved for situations where the market 
characteristics are such that antitrust is not up to 
the task.  Let me just talk a minute about antitrust 
and whether it is up to the task. 
I will start by saying that digital services 
are not necessarily inherently bad.  I think a lot of 
them are where they are today in their popularity 
because they provide something that is highly valued 
by the consumer and platforms are not necessarily 
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acting badly by charging high prices as a result of 
their innovation. 
But where they engage in unlawful conduct, 
or conduct designed to maintain their monopoly or 
otherwise distort competition, I think that is where 
antitrust needs to step in and protect the market and 
ensure that competition can thrive, that new 
competitors are able to get in and provide an 
alternative to consumers.  That is where the job of 
the antitrust enforcers is at a premium. 
While some may believe that it is possible 
that regulation may be appropriate if carefully 
tailored to address specific concerns that are not 
appropriate for antitrust — because, for example, they 
are better characterized as social policy concerns 
rather than competition concerns, or because 
circumstances are such that antitrust is incapable of 
promoting long-run consumer welfare, such as the 
natural monopoly example — I for one am not ready to 
throw in the towel on antitrust.   
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I do not think we are in a place where 
antitrust has tried and failed.  I think part of the 
problem and one of the concerns that people have is 
that it has been more than a decade over which these 
concerns have been expressed and we have not really 
taken on some of these issues. 
The transactions that are identified in the 
House report and some of the conduct concerns have 
essentially, at least so far, gone unchallenged.  Why 
have they gone unchallenged?  Is it because the 
concerns are not well founded, or is it because the 
agencies lack adequate resources, or maybe it is 
because there is too much concern with bringing a case 
that might not be won? 
I am more optimistic about antitrust than 
some.  I said at the George Mason conference earlier 
in the year, before Covid-19 hit, that the antitrust 
agencies need to get out of their comfort zone and 
bring the right cases, even if they may be hard to 
win.  I do not know that that has happened yet with 
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the current concerns that have been expressed. 
When it has happened in the past, the 
agencies have actually done quite well.  I am thinking 
in particular of the conspiracy case against Apple 
that was won and the case against Microsoft.  So when 
we have gone to bat and used the antitrust tools in a 
way that is appropriately aggressive, I think the 
agencies have done well. 
What we probably need is to invest more 
energy in bringing the right sorts of cases and not 
shying away from the possibility that they might be 
lost.  I think that is what is needed, and until that 
happens I am not ready to give up on antitrust and 
jump right to regulation. 
MS. HESSE:  I think people are eagerly 
awaiting some cases that appear to be percolating, so 
we will see.  Maybe we will see that play out. 
MR. NIGRO:  I have no idea what you are 
talking about.  [Laughter] 
MS. HESSE:  I did want to turn to Cani and 
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get your perspective on these issues because Europe 
has been very, very active in this area. 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Thank you, Renata.  Yes, you 
are right.  Big Tech’s impact on competition is one of 
the most relevant challenges for policymakers and 
enforcers.  We are concerned about increasing 
concentration and reduced contestability in markets 
dominated by digital behemoths.   
As a consequence of this, the European Union 
is considering as you know a New Competition Tool with 
some ex ante investigative powers on the ability to 
impose remedies, not necessarily applied in digital 
markets exclusively but mainly.  The European Union is 
also contemplating a potential Digital Services Act 
with a specific regulation for digital so-called 
“gatekeepers.” 
We at the Spanish Competition Authority have 
had the opportunity to state our position in our 
contributions to the consultation opened by the 
European Commission on these two instruments.  This 
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input builds on the idea that we believe strongly that 
intervention should not be taken for granted.   
A test is, in our view, needed to determine 
when intervention in a market is really necessary to 
protect effective competition, innovation, and growth, 
and thus regulation as well. 
From our point of view, the debate should 
focus first on identifying the gaps of the current 
framework and the ways to solve those gaps and, in 
view of the results of this analysis, then we should 
go to the institutional setting — so who will be in 
charge of applying potential new instruments or the 
potential need for any regulator if that is the case? 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the 
consistent implementation of the rules for digital 
players shall apply in Europe strong harmonization 
mechanisms across the European Union, and clear rules 
as well for allocating competencies between the 
Commission and the Member States.  At the moment, as 
you know, there are several cases — for example, the 
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booking hotels cases or others not really in very good 
shape. 
In addition, we believe that the current 
toolkit, which includes both antitrust policies 
forbidding concerted practices or abuse of dominant 
position, and a specific sector regulation — for 
example, energy, transport, but mainly telecoms and 
audiovisuals — will remain, in our view, the main 
instruments to address also competition problems.  It 
is a combination of both of them. 
We believe that there could be a risk of 
undermining the efficacy of the new framework by 
introducing new tools that are not yet completely 
checked out.  This is why we have suggested a clear 
hierarchy of instruments.  In our view, new policy 
instruments should be enacted only where current tools 
are not sufficient to tackle competition issues. 
I can think, for example, of two possible 
gaps under the current competition framework, at least 
at the European level.   
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First is attempted monopolization of a 
sector, which you do cover with your framework but we 
don’t because it would not fall under the category of 
an abuse if the company is not yet dominant.  We have 
Continental Can as a precedent, but Continental Can 
was already a dominant company, so we did not have the 
attempt to monopolize.  By eliminating future 
competitors we see that there is a need for 
enforcement and we do not have a very clear tool to do 
so. 
The second gap that I can identify easily is 
the risk of tacit collusion, which cannot be addressed 
in Europe under the traditional instruments against 
cartels.  This behavior can be even further 
facilitated by algorithmic techniques.   
These are two gaps that probably need some 
reflection on how to cope with them, and that is what 
we have advocated, that we need horizontal — I mean in 
general, across sectors, not only digital — and 
flexible tools while keeping predictability and legal 
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certainty, which is what businesses need in order to 
operate in a market. 
This horizontal dimension across the sectors 
is necessary given that competition problems arise 
everywhere nowadays, and in the near future we will 
have rapidly evolving economies that are not only 
digital but across other sectors.   
Furthermore, even if one wants to put an 
emphasis on digital markets, the truth is that all 
sectors are becoming now affected by digitalization, 
so we should not lose perspective there. 
Remedies and interventions where needed must 
be imposed only to those undertakings actually or 
potentially distorting competition.   
Our view is that we should follow a case-by-
case approach, even if regulation should be enforced.  
That is why the Spanish Competition Authority is 
taking advantage of our experience and our leverage as 
a multi-sectorial institution.  We in fact have two 
hats: we are the enforcement of competition policy 
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authority, we are the antitrust authority, but we are 
also the regulator in sectoral regulation and 
monitoring of subsectors, notably the telecoms and 
audiovisual sectors together with postal, transport, 
and many others.  These two in particular are 
extremely important when we are dealing with how to 
regulate the digital market. 
So we are using this multifaceted 
perspective in order to contribute to the debate on 
the optimal policy response to digital platforms for 
the sake of consumer welfare. 
MS. HESSE:  Thanks, Cani. 
I assume both Koren and Sean are interested 
in jumping into the fray. 
MS. WONG-ERVIN:  Sure.  I am with Barry.  I 
am not ready to give up on existing antitrust laws.   
I do not think we have sufficient evidence 
that there is a monopoly or concentration problem.  
There are tons of studies on this rebutting it.  I 
have written some and done things with Josh Wright and 
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Judge Ginsburg.2 
I was really happy to see AAG Delrahim and 
Chairman Simons at the recent ICN conference push back 
and warn about the dangers of rigid ex ante regulation 
as opposed to the flexible case-by-case analysis of 
antitrust.  They talked about the fact that you need 
evidence, you need an identifiable market failure as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for regulation, 
and then it needs to survive rigorous cost/benefit 
analysis. 
They also talked about the dangers of 
regulatory capture.  I was happy to hear that.  I 
think it is important to remember with this House 
report that was mentioned that it is one party putting 
it out, it was a staff report in fact, and it does not 
reflect a widespread bipartisan view.   
 
2 See Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Assessing Monopoly Power or Dominance in Platform Markets, 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Jan. 29, 2020), available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assessing-monopoly-power-or-dominance-in-
platform-markets.; Joshua D. Wright, Koren Wong-Ervin, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bruce H. 
Kobayashi, & James C. Cooper, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason 
University School of Law, on the European Commission’s Public Consultation of the Regulatory 
Environment for Platforms (Dec. 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2709188.  
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We have the antitrust agencies saying, “No, 
we do not want ex ante regulation.”  Like Barry 
mentioned, there is the paper by Commissioner Wilson 
about the dangers of it.3 
I will turn it over to Sean. 
MS. HESSE:  Let me just jump in quickly on 
that, Sean, because Koren raises a couple of good 
points, one in particular that I want to weave into 
the conversation: Is there a difference and should 
there be a difference in terms of how, for example, 
lawmakers think about these issues from a competition 
policy perspective versus what is possible in the law 
enforcement perspective in the United States, for 
example, under the Clayton and Sherman Acts?  Is that 
difference there — I think I would say there is — and 
does that mean that Congress might have greater leeway 
to act in this area if it sees a competition policy 
question? 
 
3 Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, The Growing Nostalgia for Past Regulatory Misadventures 
and the Risk of Repeating These Mistakes with Big Tech, 8 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 10 
(2020), available at https://academic.oup.com/antitrust/article/8/1/10/5614371. 
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The other issue that I wanted to flag is a 
little bit of a controversial statement.  Christine 
cites the deregulation of the airline industry as a 
success and I think there are a lot of consumers who 
view the airline industry as one of the industries 
that really does not function particularly well. 
To weave that into Koren’s point, one of the 
things that I thought a lot about when I was in the 
agency is when a consumer experiences competition in a 
market in a way that is different from how the 
agencies evaluate it, is that something that the 
agency should take note of and, not necessarily change 
how they are doing things, but at least try to think 
about why the agency enforcement agenda or how we are 
enforcing the laws does not appear to match up with 
how consumers experience competition in the 
marketplace?   
For me, the airline industry has always been 
a place where that is the case.  You hear people 
complaining constantly about airlines and complaining 
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about what we did in the Obama Administration on the 
American Airlines/US Airways case, which we believed 
was perfectly consistent and correct from a 
competition law perspective, but the consumer 
experience seems to be different. 
With that, I will pass it off to Sean.  He 
can either jump on those topics or not, and then we 
can have others talk about it. 
MR. ROYALL:  Well, there is a lot there. 
One of the things that I can say, picking up 
on what Cani was describing in terms of what is going 
on in Europe, is you talked about the difference in 
competition policy and the traditional approach in the 
United States of enforcing the antitrust laws.  I do 
think that some of the things that are being discussed 
in Europe are quite foreign to the way that we tend to 
think. 
She mentioned the New Competition Tool that 
is being discussed as one of the potential gap-filling 
mechanisms for dealing with Big Tech or Big Data.  As 
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I understand it, what is being discussed is the idea 
that when regulators perceive that a market may be 
tipping — I think the term “tipping” is used — in the 
direction of some platform achieving dominance, that 
that alone might be something that would trigger 
regulatory intervention, even if there has been no 
abusive conduct, nothing that we would consider 
exclusionary conduct, not even what Cani referred to 
as the potential to expand their authority to 
attempted dominance.   
Even if there has not been any of that, 
potentially this new tool would allow regulatory 
intervention based on a perception that a market is 
tipping and that there could be behavioral remedies or 
other remedies that could be imposed to preserve the 
ex ante status of competition.  I think that to 
American ears sounds like a pretty radical notion.  Of 
course I know these are just thoughts and this has not 
been adopted yet. 
I will say, though, that some of these 
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things that struck me as I looked at what the 
Europeans are discussing as potentially radical and 
out of step with the way we traditionally have viewed 
antitrust are coming close to home.   
I know the panelists, including myself, have 
not reviewed these lengthy documents in detail, but 
just this week the House Antitrust Subcommittee issued 
a report — and there are multiple reports; there is a 
majority report and a minority report; I think there 
may be a total of three reports — but some concepts 
are being thrown out by this House subcommittee that 
are very much akin to what the Europeans are 
considering.  I know it is very far from that actually 
happening in Europe maybe, but certainly here.  There 
are some ideas that are being thrown out that look 
very different from a competition policy standpoint 
than the way that we normally approach antitrust 
enforcement. 
MS. HESSE:  Thanks. 
Barry, Koren, or Cani, anything more on this 
 45 
 
 
 
 
topic, or should we move on? 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Yes, let me add something. 
I understand that the approach in Europe is 
different to that of the United States, but I would 
like to bring here an example of a Regulation that was 
imposed at the European level that in fact has worked 
well in the area of telecoms.   
We have the net neutrality principle.  That 
was, as you know, an experience that we had in 
electronic communications.  There was a Regulation at 
the European level, and national regulation 
authorities were supervising the existence and respect 
of this net neutrality, which is very relevant in 
areas such as Internet platforms. 
As you know, this debate originated from the 
fear that Internet service providers, by managing the 
traffic carried their networks, could act as 
gatekeepers for providers of content or applications.  
This was the Open Internet Regulation at the European 
level that was addressing these topics.  The 
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Regulation was prohibiting technical blocking or 
throttling of applications with some exceptions. 
This Regulation was followed by Guidelines 
that were adopted in 2016 and which are now under 
review for updating. I would say that this open 
Internet principle has worked so far relatively well 
and that net neutrality has proved to be a 
procompetitive element. 
I understand that maybe the view on the 
other side of the Atlantic is a different one, but it 
is not the first time that a debate on how to regulate 
situations in which you may have a gatekeeper has 
happened in Europe. 
I have to say that even if I was supporting 
case-by-case analysis and the need to really analyze 
first the market failures and the gaps before 
introducing legislation, the truth is that we have 
already have an experience that has worked out very 
well in Europe. 
MS. HESSE:  There has been a tremendous 
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debate in the United States around net neutrality 
also, so that is something that has arisen here. 
Barry, do you want to jump in, or do you 
want to move on?  Cani provided us with a perfect 
segue to our next topic, which is gatekeepers, but I 
are happy to have you jump in if you would like. 
MR. NIGRO:  I would just like to reiterate 
that I think there is a cost associated with 
regulating ex ante.  It does create a risk of chilling 
procompetitive behavior, and that sort of regulation 
should only be used as a last resort where the 
competition laws have sought to be enforced and failed 
and there is actual concrete evidence of 
anticompetitive effects. 
I know you are going to talk about 
gatekeepers, but I think an important part of that 
conversation is what we mean when we say “gatekeeper?”  
If I walk into a Kroger, Kroger is the gatekeeper to 
everything in the store, but does that matter?   
So I think it is important when you talk 
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about gatekeepers to define it in a precise way, which 
is one of the points I made at the very beginning of 
our talk today.  Maybe it is another way of talking 
about market definition, what is the relevant market, 
and what role does the particular firm being focused 
on have in the market? 
But I will let you move on to the next 
topic. 
MS. HESSE:  Great. 
We are running long.  I just want everybody 
to know we are going to run over our allotted time.  
We are supposed to end in a minute.  I do not want to 
run over too much for personal reasons — my husband is 
moderating the next panel and he will get mad at me if 
I make him too late.  I am just kidding — he is 
moderating it, but he is not going to get mad at me. 
James said it is okay for us to keep going a 
little bit, so we are going to keep going and the next 
panel will join us.  I think we have ten more minutes, 
so we will go to 11:30.   
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I have seen no questions come through the 
Q&A.  I encourage people, given that we are nearing 
the end of our time, if you have questions to please 
throw them into the Q&A, and we will try to answer 
them. 
With that, I will hand it off to Koren, who 
is going to take us out on — I have been doing a lot 
of Peloton, and they say, “So-and-so, take us out” — 
our gatekeeper question — what does it mean to be a 
gatekeeper, and should we be concerned about them; 
and, if so, why? 
MS. WONG-ERVIN:  I agree with Barry that it 
is important to be clear about what you are talking 
about. 
The gatekeeper framework is based on the 
model of a two-sided platform in which you have one 
side (Group A, for let’s say Internet Operating System 
(iOS) users that single-home) and another side (Group 
B, let’s say application developers that multihome so 
that they can reach all the users of the different 
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platforms).  The idea is that  the only way for the 
application developers to reach users of the iOS 
platform is to join the platform.   
According to the theory, the iOS platform 
has a “monopoly” over access to those specific users 
irrespective of its market share or how competitive 
the market is for all users of the different operating 
system platforms.  This theory has at least two built-
in assumptions. 
The first, of course, is that the Group A 
users single-home because, if they multihome, then 
members of Group B can reach them outside the 
platform. 
The second assumption is that there are no 
effective market mechanisms to constrain the 
platform’s ability and incentive to set high prices or 
restrictive policies to the multihoming side.  So the 
idea is that consumers on Site A cannot switch if the 
platform imposed a price increase or restricted 
policies on Site B. 
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But of course, this is contrary to our 
fundamental economic understanding of platforms, which 
is that there are interactions or interdependent 
demand between the two sides that serve as a 
competitive constraint on the platform vis-à-vis 
members of Group B.   
So, for example, in response to a price 
increase the application developer could pass through 
those higher prices to the users on the other side, 
which, because of positive indirect network effects, 
can reduce demand for those users.  And some 
application developers may even leave the platform, 
which again can affect demand on the other side. 
To sum up, I think there are three issues.  
The first is what Barry mentioned, a market 
definition.  Are we really defining a market as just 
the users of iOS platforms, even if they have a small 
overall market share of all the platforms in the 
market?  And then also there this idea that we are 
ignoring the market mechanisms at play.   
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The last thing I will say with regard to 
multihoming is there is ample evidence of multihoming 
in various markets, not just social media.4 
MS. HESSE:  One question I wanted to add 
that came to mind as Koren was talking is that there 
is legal precedent for defining single-brand 
submarkets.  I take the two-sided market point, but I 
think in the US Airways/Sabre case the court of 
appeals endorsed a single-brand submarket, and there 
have been other cases where that has been the case.  I 
would be interested to know how people think that 
plays into this gatekeeper platform question. 
MR. ROYALL:  Part of what I was going to 
comment on here I think we have already discussed, 
which is what is going on in Europe and the 
regulations that are being considered, which I think 
are in part in response to gatekeepers — we heard Cani 
 
4 See, e.g., LAWRENCE WU & JOHN SCALF, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF 
ADVERTISER MULTIHOMING (2012) (“Approximately 98 percent of the total ad spend managed 
through DoubleClick Search is by advertisers that use both Google and Bing/Yahoo!”); HBS 
DIGITAL INITIATIVE, How Did We Decide Where to Eat Before Yelp? (Mar. 5, 2018) available at 
https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-digit/submission/how-did-we-decide-where-to-eat-before-yelp 
(noting that multihoming costs are low for users where access to platforms are free, as is the case 
with Yelp).  
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say “gatekeeper” a number of times — so there are 
gatekeeper concerns there.   
In Europe, as I understand it, I do not know 
how widely held, but there is a fairly popular view 
that these dominant digital platforms are essential 
facilities.  As I understand it — Cani can correct me 
— I think there may be within the European regulatory 
framework an ability to designate a business as an 
essential facility, which has been done with railroads 
and others, and I understand there may be some 
proposals to formally designate certain dominant 
digital platforms as essential facilities. 
In the United States, this gatekeeper 
concept or dominant platform concept is something 
that, at least in terms of government antitrust 
enforcement, I do not know that we have seen yet many 
examples of that.   
There is some current private litigation.  
The Epic case relating to the Fortnite app against 
Apple is an example where concepts like this are being 
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thrown out. 
Barry, you may want to talk about this.  I 
know that you gave a speech, which I read in 
preparation for this, that really got at this idea of 
whether the essential facilities concept is 
appropriate to apply here.  I think you made a 
distinction between competing within the market and 
competing for the market, and I thought made some good 
points about potential adverse effects in terms of 
disincentivizing investments and innovation if you 
were to go too heavily after companies that do arrive 
in an arguably dominant platform position. 
MR. NIGRO:  That is right, I did talk about 
those principles in the context of Big Data.   
All of these things have a tradeoff in 
forced sharing of a product or a service.  I think it 
is obvious that if you tell somebody: “If you invest, 
take a big risk, invest a lot of money and time trying 
to come up with an innovation that you hope will be 
highly valued, and you hit on something that is very 
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successful and popular, guess what?  You will have to 
share that with the rest of the world because you may 
be deemed an essential facility.” 
The cost of that type of rule is to dampen 
the willingness to take on that risk, to make that 
investment, and it is at the expense of long-term 
innovation.  These rules may address short-term 
concerns, but I think they are very detrimental to 
long-term innovation.   
Facilitating competition within the market 
comes at the expense of competition for the market, 
and there is a cost, just like with all regulation we 
talked about earlier, associated with that sort of an 
approach.  That is why I think ultimately going back 
to tools that are flexible and can deal with the facts 
on the ground, like antitrust law, should be the 
starting point, and I continue to think it is not 
appropriate to give up on antitrust just yet. 
MS. HESSE:  We do not have any questions in 
the queue and we are perilously close to 11:30.   
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I want to give each of you a chance to say a 
few final words, if you would like, and I will then 
close us out.   
I think this has been a great discussion.  
It has been interesting to hear all of the different 
perspectives, and I hope those of you who are watching 
and listening enjoyed it as well. 
Let me go in reverse order.  Koren, anything 
you want to jump in on? 
MS. WONG-ERVIN:  On the House Judiciary 
report and the other proposals, I want to caution 
against going back to the pre-GTE/Sylvania days and 
ignoring the robust body of empirical and other 
economic research on verticals and mergers and the 
like.  I hope that the U.S. antitrust agencies will 
continue to be leaders in defending the existing 
approach. 
MS. HESSE:  Sean? 
MR. ROYALL:  I do not want to say much.  I 
enjoyed being on the panel.   
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I do agree with Barry, though.  I have not 
given up on traditional antitrust, and I believe that 
the rigorous approach, including focusing, as we did 
earlier when we were taking about lock-in and 
causation and these other concepts, I think have 
served us well, and I think they will continue to 
serve us well.  I think we have plenty of tools to get 
at these issues when there really are problems, even 
without coming up with new regulation. 
MS. HESSE:  Barry, any last comment? 
MR. NIGRO:  I look forward to seeing what 
happens over the next few months and few years.  I 
think we are going to be in for interesting times when 
it comes to antitrust.  I can only hope that we 
continue to value competition and some of the 
principles that have grown up around that and that 
have, to be honest, worked pretty well for the most 
part.   
That does not mean that tweaks here and 
there to some of our laws may not be appropriate, but 
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I think overall the antitrust laws have done a good 
job and with effective, aggressive enforcement and the 
right cases can achieve a lot. 
MS. HESSE:  And this time, last but not 
least, Cani, who I feel has been a little bit 
outnumbered in this discussion. 
MS. FERNÁNDEZ:  Oh, let’s continue to be 
outnumbered.  Some food for thought with the current 
system of antitrust and merger control, which I very 
much like, because I know it very well and I know to 
apply it.   
The truth is that we have not been able to 
keep markets open, or at least not concentrated in 
very high levels, and I wonder whether the current 
system — and let us go for merger control, for example 
— allowing for Facebook/WhatsApp, Facebook/Instagram, 
Google/DoubleClick is sufficiently good if its purpose 
to prevent high concentration in the market because, 
as we all know, the more concentrated the market, the 
less likely it is for competition.  Well — question 
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mark — is there anything needed there?   
MS. HESSE:  I for one am a big fan of 
regulatory humility and of the enforcement agencies 
everywhere in the world continuing to self-evaluate 
and make sure that they are matching what they are 
doing with both the law that we have but also with 
consumer experiences.  It is important every once in a 
while to step back and take a look. 
I am going to be very interested to see what 
happens over the next weeks and months and years as 
antitrust continues to be at the center point for a 
lot of issues that are coming up both in the United 
States and abroad. 
With that, I would like to thank everyone 
for your contributions.  I would like to thank the 
audience for staying with us, which hopefully they 
did. 
 
